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?E William A. Kaplin 
A Proposed Process for Managing 
the First Amendment Aspects 
of Campus Hate Speech 
The hate speech phenomenon presents complex and 
potentially agonizing problems for American colleges and universities. 
The problem has attained high visibility in recent years as reports of hate 
behavior incidents on college campuses have increased. In response, 
many institutions have amended their student conduct codes or promul- 
gated new regulatory policies to combat actual or potential hate speech 
problems. Various nonregulatory initiatives, not dependent on establish- 
ment of behavioral standards and punishment of violators, have also 
been implemented. 1 
For public institutions, attempts to regulate hate speech raise substan- 
tial legal issues under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
For private institutions, which may not be bound by the First Amend- 
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ment, attempts to regulate hate speech raise sensitive policy questions 
concerning the role of free expression on campus. Numerous articles 
(many of which are listed in the references below) have undertaken sub- 
stantive analysis of these constitutional issues and policy questions. In 
contrast, this article explores a preliminary and overarching concern: the 
process by which a college or university addresses the problem of hate 
speech, and in particular the process by which the institution manages 
the First Amendment aspects of the problem. In other words, this arti- 
cle focuses on the decision-making process rather than on the decisions 
themselves; it is the journey, not the destination, that is of primary 
concern. 
The Character and Harms of Hate Speech 
The term "hate speech," as commonly understood, refers to verbal and 
written words, and to symbolic acts, that convey a grossly negative as- 
sessment of particular persons or groups based on their race, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. Hate speech thus is 
highly derogatory and degrading, and the language is typically coarse. 
The purpose of the speech is more to humiliate or wound than it is to 
communicate ideas or information. Epithets, slurs, insults, taunts, and 
threats are common labels used to describe hate speech. 
Hate speech takes many forms. It is not limited to a face-to-face con- 
frontation or shouts from a crowd. It may appear on T-shirts, on pos- 
ters, on classroom blackboards, on student bulletin boards, in flyers and 
leaflets, in phone calls, in letters, or in electronic mail messages on com- 
puter screens. Hate speech may be a cartoon appearing in a student pub- 
lication, a joke told on a campus radio show, an anonymous note slipped 
under a dormitory or meeting room door, or graffiti scribbled on walls 
or sidewalks. Hate speech may be conveyed through destruction or de- 
facement of posters or displays; through symbols such as burning crosses, 
swastikas, KKK insignia, and Confederate flags; and even through 
themes for social functions, such as black-face Harlem parties, jungle 
parties, or white history week parties. 
Hate speech is a particular concern because of the harm it causes to 
the victim, the victimized group, the campus community, and ultimately 
to society [5, pp. 135-49; 14, pp. 458-66; 18, pp. 2335-41; 23, pp. 
271-77, 317-24]. On one level, when hate speech is directed at particu- 
lar individuals, it causes real hurt to those individuals. The victim may 
feel humiliation, shock, outrage, fear, and anxiety - both at the time 
the hate speech is inflicted and for long after the incident. These may be 
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psychic rather than physical injuries, and the result may be emotional 
rather than physical scarring, but the wounds are every bit as real. 
On another level, hate speech inflicts pain on the broader class of per- 
sons who belong to the group which the hate speech denigrates. If 
blacks are targeted by a particular hate speech incident, for instance, all 
blacks on campus who become aware of the incident may be hurt - not 
just the person who was subjected to the speech or those who personally 
witnessed it. On yet another level, hate speech causes harm to the entire 
campus community - with the heaviest burdens still borne by the vic- 
timized groups [18, pp. 2370-73]. The feelings of vulnerability, insecur- 
ity, and alienation that repeated incidents of hate speech engender in the 
victimized groups may undermine the conditions necessary to construc- 
tive dialogue on campus [14, pp. 437, 456, 467-71; 19, p. 25]. Members 
of the victimized groups, moreover, may be unable to take full advan- 
tage of the educational opportunities available at the university [23, pp. 
275-77, 317-18]. A sense of community - both for the residential com- 
munity and for the community of learners - may be lost to the campus. 
All these various harms of hate speech implicate deeply held values of 
equality and individual dignity. Whenever threats to these values move 
higher educational institutions to prohibit hate speech and punish its 
purveyors, however, free speech values become implicated as well. It is 
because both sets of values are at stake - and because the resulting 
value clashes raise complex issues concerning the mission of higher edu- 
cation [23, pp. 318-25] - that institutions must approach the hate 
speech problem with exceeding sensitivity and care. 
First Amendment Aspects of Hate Speech 
Hate speech employs words and symbols to convey a message. Cam- 
pus hate speech regulations may serve to prohibit such messages and 
punish the speakers for what they have said. Institutional attempts to 
regulate hate speech thus raise constitutional issues under the free speech 
and free press clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Formally, only public colleges and universities are bound by the First 
Amendment; private institutions, not being engaged in state action, are 
not so constrained [13, pp. 18-24]. In practice, however, private institu- 
tions may voluntarily commit themselves to comply with First Amend- 
ment norms. In the context of hate speech, many private institutions 
have undertaken to do so and thus will be as concerned with First 
Amendment principles as are public institutions. 
Four major free speech principles serve to constrain the authority of 
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institutions to regulate hate speech. The combined impact of these prin- 
ciples is substantial, and the constraints which arise from them are se- 
vere. As suggested below, however, these principles do not eliminate all 
possibilities for regulating hate speech; nor do they limit the use of non- 
regulatory alternatives for dealing with the problem. 
Under the first free speech principle, regulations of the content of 
speech - that is, of the speaker's message, and especially of the speak- 
er's viewpoint - are highly suspect. As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
frequently stated, "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. . . . There is an 'equality of 
status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of 
view an equal opportunity to be heard" [24, pp. 95-96; see also 34, pp. 
1173-74]. Under this principle, a content-based restriction on speech 
will be unconstitutional unless: (1) the restricted speech falls within one 
of the narrow exceptions such as those for obscenity, defamation, and 
fighting words [30, pp. 3-5]; or (2) the restriction "is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end" [35, p. 270]. 
Under the second free speech principle, the emotional content as well 
as the cognitive content of speech is protected from government regula- 
tion. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court explained that 
[m]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it con- 
veys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but 
otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as 
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view 
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual 
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically 
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall mes- 
sage. . . . [4, p. 26; see also 34, p. 1175]. 
Under the third free speech principle, speech may not be prohibited 
merely because persons who hear or view it are offended by the message. 
Only last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "if there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable" [31, p. 2544; see also 1 1, p. 795]. 
The Court has also indicated that this principle applies even to "virulent 
ethnic and religious epithets . . . and scurrilous caricatures" [33, p. 
2410], and that this principle applies specifically to higher educational 
institutions: "[T]he mere dissemination of ideas - no matter how offen- 
sive to good taste - on a state university campus may not be shut off in 
the name alone of 'conventions of decency' " [21, p. 670]. 
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Under the fourth free speech principle, government may not regulate 
speech activity with provisions whose language is either overbroad or 
vague and would thereby create a chilling effect on the exercise of free 
speech rights. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Because First Amend- 
ment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regu- 
late in the area only with narrow specificity" [20, p. 433; see also 6, p. 
864 and 34, p. 1168]. 
Each of these four free speech principles applies fully to colleges and 
universities. The Supreme Court has asserted that "the First Amend- 
ment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the aca- 
demic community with respect to the content of speech" [21, p. 671]. 
And in Healy v. James, the Court emphasized that 
the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that . . . First 
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses 
than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary, "The vigilant protec- 
tion of Constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the commun- 
ity of American schools." [9, pp. 180-81, quoting 26, p. 487]. 
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
academic communities are "special environments," and that "First Amend- 
ment rights . . . [must be] applied in light of the special characteristics 
of the school environment. . . ." [9, p. 180; 32, p. 506; 35, p. 268 n.5]. 
As the Court has further explained, "[a] university differs in significant 
respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal 
theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court 
have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regula- 
tions compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facili- 
ties" [35, p. 268 n.5]. The interests that academic institutions may protect 
and promote and the nature of threats to these interests may thus differ 
from the interests which may exist for other types of institutions and in 
other contexts [3; 23, pp. 318-25]. Therefore, although First Amend- 
ment principles do apply with full force to the campus, their application 
may be affected by the unique interests of academic communities. 
The Importance of Process 
To take full account of the four free speech principles above, in con- 
junction with the many other complexities of hate speech problems, 
higher education institutions need a structured process for decision mak- 
ing on these matters. The design of the process, every bit as much as the 
substantive analysis of First Amendment law, is critical to the success of 
an institution's endeavors in the hate speech arena. Clearly, not any pro- 
cess will do. The following five criteria describe attributes that an insti- 
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tutional process should possess if it is to facilitate effective management 
of the hate speech problem. 
Criterion Number One: The process must foster a comprehensive 
approach to, and comprehensive perspective on, the hate speech prob- 
lem on American campuses. To meet this criterion, the process must en- 
compass both the legal and the policy aspects of the hate speech problem 
and must include consideration of both equality and free speech values. 
The process must also expose the relevant sociological, psychological, 
and philosophical aspects of the problem, so that the expertise of these 
disciplines might illuminate the underlying causes of hate behavior and 
its effects upon individuals, groups, and institutions. The process must 
also facilitate collection of information on the extent and manifestations 
of the hate speech problem on American campuses. 
Criterion Number Two: The process must both encourage and rely 
upon dialogue within the campus community. The full range of campus 
interests and perspectives should be reflected in this dialogue. Thus all 
of the various constituencies represented in the student body should be 
included, as should faculty and administrative staff. Such dialogue should 
be both a starting point for, and an end product of, the process. At the 
start, the process should flush out and seek mutual respect for the differ- 
ing points of view regarding the hate speech problem. At its end, the 
process should have begun to foster conditions of tolerance that allow 
the dialogue to continue productively into the future [19, pp. 24-25]. 
Criterion Number Three: The process must encompass andfacilitate 
consideration of nonregulatory as well as regulatory options for manag- 
ing the hate speech problem, giving priority to the nonregulatory op- 
tions. There are two quite different approaches to dealing with hate 
speech on campus: the regulatory approach and the nonregulatory ap- 
proach.2 The former, unlike the latter, relies on the prohibition of certain 
types of speech and the imposition of involuntary sanctions on trans- 
gressors. As between the two, nonregulatory initiatives may reach or 
engage a wider range of students, may have a more influential impact on 
student attitudes and values [17, pp. 245-46; 27, pp. 934-36 and 943-44], 
and may better foster an institutional environment inhospitable to hate 
behavior. Thus, nonregulatory initiatives may have a broader and longer- 
range impact on the hate speech problem. Nonregulatory initiatives may 
also be more in harmony with higher education's mission to foster criti- 
cal examination and dialogue in the search for truth [27, pp. 942-44]. 
Nonregulatory initiatives, moreover, do not raise substantial First Amend- 
2Various nonregulatory options are included in Phase IV.A of the proposed process 
set out below. Various regulatory options are included in Phases IV.B and VII of the 
process. 
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ment issues or risk erosion of free speech values as regulatory initiatives 
do. For these reasons, the decision-making process should focus first on 
nonregulatory options, moving to regulatory options only if - and to 
the extent - the institution determines that nonregulatory initiatives 
will not suitably alleviate the hate speech problem. 
Criterion Number Four: The process must assure that the institu- 
tion 's initiatives for combating hate speech are adapted to the particular 
circumstances of its particular campus. There is no all-purpose solution 
for hate speech that can fit all campuses. Campuses differ from one 
another in many relevant respects - in the climate of tolerance that pre- 
vails, in the diversity of the student body, in the perceptions and atti- 
tudes commonly shared by students, in patterns of social interaction, in 
institutional structure and mission. Campuses also differ in terms of 
their actual experiences with the hate speech problem. The number of 
reported incidents varies substantially from campus to campus, as do 
the types of incidents, their effect on the campus environment, and the 
pattern of institutional responses. The process should assure that these 
differences and variables are taken into account, so that the problems 
are addressed in terms most meaningful to that campus and the solu- 
tions are crafted to its particular reality and experience. 
Criterion Number Five: The process must focus on First Amendment 
issues in an exceedingly methodical and concrete way calculated to shed 
maximum light on legal obstacles to regulation as well as available lati- 
tude for regulatory initiatives. It would be a mistake to approach the 
complex First Amendment issues of hate speech in the abstract. As the 
legal philosopher, John Chipman Gray, warned over 60 years ago: 
The danger in dealing with abstract conceptions, whether in the Law or in 
any other department of human knowledge, is that of losing foothold on the 
actual earth. The best guard against this is the concrete instance, the exam- 
ple. . . . I shall, therefore, try to test the soundness of any theories I may 
advance, by applying them to sets of facts and seeing how they work in prac- 
tice [7, pp. 4-5]. 
To achieve such concreteness, the process must provide for identification 
of each particular type of hate speech the institution desires to regulate 
and determination of whether some particular First Amendment theory 
would support regulation of each such type of hate speech. This process 
of matching the concrete example and the specific theory must be me- 
thodical because different types of regulations will require different types 
of analysis under the First Amendment. There is no omnibus regulatory 
approach that can serve all of an institution's regulatory interests regard- 
ing hate speech, nor is there any grand First Amendment theory that 
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can justify regulation of all the types of hate speech an institution might 
wish to reach. In each instance, therefore, the question will be whether 
some particular type of regulation covering some particular type of hate 
speech can be drafted and enforced without substantially intruding upon 
free speech values and without substantial risk that a court would later 
find the regulation unconstitutional. 
A Proposed Process for Managing the Hate Speech Problem 
What specific process might meet the five criteria set out above? The 
following nine-phase process provides a specific example that should fit 
the needs of most institutions seeking to address the hate speech problem. 
The proposed process is phrased in terms of steps for "the institution" 
to take. It does not further specify which administrators or bodies within 
the institution will implement or oversee the process or who will make 
the final decisions concerning the options and strategic choices that will 
arise as the process proceeds. These matters should be addressed before 
the process is initiated - and should be reconsidered as the process pro- 
ceeds, because unforeseen options may arise that fall within the author- 
ity of administrators or bodies that have not been assigned decision- 
making roles within the process. Moreover, the institution's legal counsel 
should be involved in the process from the beginning and should be es- 
pecially involved in Phases V-IX. 
Phase I. Preparation 
A. Researching the manifestations and effects of the hate speech 
problem on American campuses. 
B. Studying your institution's missions and goals as they relate to the 
hate speech problem 
C. Listening to complaints and perspectives of the campus commun- 
ity 
D. Initiating campus dialogue on the problem and appropriate re- 
sponses. 
Phase II. Canvassing and Cataloging 
A. Collecting facts on specific hate behavior incidents on your cam- 
pus, or illustrative incidents from other campuses 
B. Characterizing specific incidents (for example, racist, sexist, or 
homophobic incident; for example, incident perpetrated by stu- 
dent, by staff member, or by outsider; for example, incident in- 
volving speech or incident not involving speech). 
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Phase III. Understanding the Problem 
A. Nature and extent of the hate behavior problem on your campus 
B. The groups that are victimized and the types of harms inflicted 
C. Underlying causes of the hate behavior problem 
D. Free speech aspects of the hate behavior problem. 
Phase IV. Identifying Options 
A. Nonregulatory options 
1. Education options 
a. curriculum revisions 
b. orientation programs 
c. special presentations 
2. Training options 
a. training for student leaders 
b. training for staff (for example, hall advisers, campus secur- 
ity officers) 
3. Diversity options (revising admissions or hiring processes to 
increase campus diversity) 
4. Extracurricular programming options (sponsoring activities 
that bring various groups together and break down barriers; 
for example, community service projects) 
5. Support options (helping victims to heal and perpetrators to 
understand effects of actions; for example, counseling services) 
6. Counter-speech options (condemning/ repudiating hate behav- 
ior incidents: institutional officials, student leaders, and cam- 
pus groups as counter-speakers) 
7. Communication options (improving channels of communica- 
tion between administrators and students, and among various 
student constituencies; for example, processes for reporting 
hate behavior incidents, open forums for discussion of race re- 
lations issues) 
8. Conflict-resolution options (for example, voluntary mediation 
for persons or groups affected by hate behavior incidents) 
B. Regulatory options 
1. External regulation (for example, ethnic intimidation laws, civil 
rights laws, state tort law) 
2. Internal regulation (for example, student codes of conduct, 
nondiscrimination policies). 
Phase V. Selecting Options 
A. Giving priority to nonregulatory options 
B. Matching options to objectives 
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C. Considering incremental approaches utilizing combinations of 
options 
D. Obtaining input and feedback. 
Phase VI. Pursuing Internal Regulation: Determining What to Regu- 
late (the "catalog and shopping list" approach) 
A. Studying the catalog of hate behavior incidents (II above) in light 
of the options selected (V above) 
B. Creating a shopping list of types of incidents to be regulated. 
Phase VII. Pursuing Internal Regulation: Determining How to Regulate 
Consistent with the First Amendment (matching shopping list items 
to free speech theories) 
A. Regulating hate behavior that does not use words or symbols to 
convey a message (the "nonspeech" rationale) 
B. Regulating the nonspeech aspects of a course of conduct that has 
both speech and nonspeech aspects (the expressive conduct ratio- 
nale) 
C. Regulating the time, place, or manner of hate speech (the content- 
neutral rationale) 
D. Regulating hate speech that is obscene or defamatory or consti- 
tutes incitement or fighting words (miscellaneous rationales per- 
mitting content-based regulations of speech) 
E. Regulating hate speech addressed to particular individuals in 
whom it creates realistic fear for personal safety or security of 
property (the intimidation/threat/harassment rationale) 
F. Regulating hate speech in private areas which infringes upon indi- 
viduals' privacy interests (the captive audience/ invasion-of-privacy 
rationale) 
G. Regulating hate speech that implements or reinforces a pattern of 
discriminatory conduct (the nondiscrimination rationale) 
H. Regulating pervasive patterns of hate speech that prevent a par- 
ticular targeted group from obtaining full benefit of an education 
(the equal educational opportunity rationale). 
Phase VIII. Internal Regulation: Other Legal Considerations 
A. Avoiding overbreadth and vagueness in drafting regulations 
B. Considering First Amendment issues that may arise in the impo- 
sition of particular penalties on particular violators. 
C. Complying with state constitutional rights of free expression 
D. Differentiating First Amendment standards for regulating student 
speech from those for regulating employee speech. 
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Phase IX. Internal Regulation: Strategic Considerations 
A. Determining which general types of hate speech are to be regu- 
lated: racist? sexist? homophobic? ethnic? anti-semitic? 
B. Determining which persons are to be protected: only persons 
from historic victim groups (for example, blacks, women, reli- 
gious minorities) or all persons (whites as well as blacks, and so 
on.) 
C. Determining the persons whose speech is to be regulated: stu- 
dents only? also faculty? also staff? 
D. Determining whether student organizations as well as individual 
students will be subject to regulation 
E. Determining the intention with which a speaker must have acted 
before his actions will violate the regulations or be subject to an 
enhanced penalty: an intent to harm the victim? an intent to dis- 
criminate by race, sex, and so on? or no intent requirement, so 
that unintentional actions will nevertheless violate the regulations? 
F. Determining the types and levels of sanctions to be applied to vio- 
lators: punitive (suspension, expulsion)? educational or remedial 
(counseling, sensitivity training, community service)? 
Implementation of the Proposed Process 
The nine-phase process provides a logical progression for addressing 
the hate speech problem on a particular campus. All institutions that 
choose to address this problem through this process should follow at 
least the first three phases. Institutions that decide to take some action 
concerning hate speech should proceed at least through Phase V. Institu- 
tions that decide to pursue internal regulation should complete the rest 
of the process. 
The following commentary further explains each of the nine phases, 
with particular emphasis on the regulatory phases (VI-IX). 
Phase L This phase responds to criteria no. 1 and no. 2 above. The 
institution marshals general information and opinion relevant to the 
hate speech phenomenon on American campuses generally as well as on 
its own campus. The institution also seeks to initiate and nurture cam- 
pus dialogue concerning hate speech. These steps lay the foundation for 
further consideration of the problem. 
Phase I. This phase responds to criterion no. 4 above. The institu- 
tion particularizes the hate speech phenomenon to its own campus and 
makes its inquiry as concrete as possible. In effect, the institution creates 
a "catalog" of specific incidents that have occurred on its campus and 
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have concerned students or administrators, supplementing it with repre- 
sentative examples of incidents from other campuses. 
Phase III. This phase further responds to criteria no. 1 and no. 4 
above. Using information and insight gained in Phases I and II, the in- 
stitution develops a comprehensive understanding of the hate speech 
phenomenon on its campus and in general. Obviously, the institution 
must understand the phenomenon before it will be in a position to de- 
termine whether it has a problem requiring action, or what action might 
be required. 
Phase IV. This phase responds to criterion no. 3 above. It is of criti- 
cal importance that the institution identify and weigh nonregulatory op- 
tions before focusing on regulatory options. If it does focus on regulatory 
options, the institution should consider not only internal regulation but 
also reliance on external regulation - that is, the enforcement of fed- 
eral, state, and local law that may apply to some hate behavior [5, 15]. In 
this phase, the institution should also identify existing resources (for ex- 
ample, courses on race relations or multiculturalism; complaint or re- 
porting mechanisms, disciplinary or grievance processes) that might be 
utilized in devising or implementing options, and existing personnel (for 
example, affirmative action officers, counseling center staff, student ju- 
dicial affairs officers) who can assist in creating new options. 
Phase V. This phase further responds to criteria nos. 2, 3, and 4 
above. To proceed through this phase, the institution should, in short, 
"determine the objectives, examine the alternative methods of obtaining 
these objectives, and choose the best method for doing so" [2, p. 5]. Be- 
cause it is unlikely that any one option (or method) standing alone will 
achieve institutional objectives regarding hate speech, the institution 
should consider combinations of nonregulatory options or nonregula- 
tory options combined with external or internal regulatory options, each 
option making an incremental contribution to resolving the overall prob- 
lem. Just as it is important to obtain input in identifying options (see 
Phase IV above), it is important to obtain input in selecting options and 
feedback on the tentative selections. Such input and feedback may be 
considered a continuation of the campus dialogue initiated in Phase I. D 
of the process and could be implemented through informal mechanisms 
such as opportunities to comment on tentative proposals, as well as 
more formal mechanisms such as open hearings in which witnesses tes- 
tify concerning proposed options. 
Phase VI. This phase further responds to criterion no. 4 above and 
provides a partial response to criterion no. 5. Phase VI builds upon the 
work done under Phase II. Phase II used the metaphor of the "catalog"; 
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this phase uses the metaphor of the "shopping list" that is drawn from 
the catalog. This shopping list of types of hate speech incidents that the 
institution wishes to regulate provides a concrete, realistic focus for the 
institution's consideration of internal regulatory options in Phase VII. 
Phase VII. This phase further responds to criterion no. 5 above. In- 
stitutions proceeding through this phase must pay particular attention to 
the four free speech principles set out above. What is called for, in effect, 
is a matching process. The institution attempts to match each item on its 
shopping list (from Phase VI) to some acceptable First Amendment ra- 
tionale for regulation, keeping in mind that "regulatory failure some- 
times means a failure to correctly match the tool to the problem at 
hand" [2, p. 191]. This regimen of matching will likely result in a combi- 
nation of internal regulatory approaches, each one geared to a particular 
segment of the hate behavior the institution wishes to confront. 
Under such an incremental approach, it is unlikely that all the items 
on the institution's shopping list could be regulated consistent with the 
First Amendment. Some items could be regulated only at the price of 
substantial intrusion upon free speech values and substantial risk of later 
judicial invalidation. The institution may consider such a price to be too 
high and may therefore remove the risky items from its list. 
To guide the matching process, Phase VII sets forth eight approaches 
to regulating "hate behavior segments" consistent with the First Amend- 
ment. It is clear that the approaches in VII. A, B, C, and D could be 
constitutionally implemented with carefully crafted regulations.3 Strong 
arguments can also be made to support the approaches in VII. E and F, 
but due to the relative paucity of precedent directly on point, their con- 
stitutionality is not quite as clear as for approaches A-D. The approaches 
in VII. G and H are the most speculative of the eight approaches, but 
solid arguments and some precedent can be marshalled in their support. 
The following discussion briefly examines each of the eight proposed 
regulatory approaches. 
A. The institution may regulate hate behavior that does not use words 
or symbols to convey a message and therefore does not involve 
3There is continuing controversy, however, over the validity and scope of the "fighting 
words" rationale in VII.D [14, pp. 449-57]; [29, pp. 508-14]; [17, pp. 252-63]; [8, pp. 
294-98; 16, pp. 222-25]. The defamation rationale in VII.D would also become contro- 
versial if extended to "group defamation" (that is, statements defaming racial or other 
groups rather than individuals as such). Many commentators and courts have concluded 
that group defamation laws would likely be unconstitutional [8, pp. 303-6; 29, pp. 
517-20; 16, pp. 225-26], and the defamation rationale contemplated by VII.D is accord- 
ingly limited to defamation of individuals. 
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protected speech. Examples of such behavior, that have occurred 
in recent years on college campuses, include throwing eggs, public 
urination, spreading human excrement, burning buildings, kick- 
ing, shoving, beatings, spitting, stone throwing, trashing of rooms, 
and blocking of pathways and entryways. Such actions clearly are 
not protected by the First Amendment. All such activities can 
therefore be reached under carefully drafted regulations concern- 
ing physical attacks, destruction or defacement of property, and 
other prohibited acts such as indecent exposure or arson. 
B. When hate speech is combined with nonspeech actions in the 
same course of behavior, the institution may regulate the non- 
speech aspects of the behavior without violating the First Amend- 
ment. For example, a campus building may be spray-painted with 
swastikas or hate slogans; graffiti may be painted on campus side- 
walks; epithets may be carved or burned into a dorm room door. 
All these behaviors convey messages; all therefore involve speech. 
The behavior also has a nonspeech aspect, however; it constitutes 
a destruction of property. While an institution cannot prohibit par- 
ticular messages, it can prohibit destructive acts. Such acts may 
therefore be covered under neutral regulations governing such 
nonspeech matters as destruction and defacement of property.4 
C. Even though the institution usually may not regulate the content 
of speech (free speech principle no. 1), it may regulate the time, 
place, or manner of speech. For instance, an institution may regu- 
late noise levels in or near the library during library hours, or near 
classrooms while classes are in session, or on dormitory quadran- 
gles during hours when residents are likely sleeping; or an institu- 
tion may prohibit the construction of symbolic displays or struc- 
tures in certain areas of the campus. Such regulations will usually 
be constitutional if they are applied alike to all speech rather than 
selectively applied only to hate speech. Thus, for example, if an 
4Under this regulatory approach, it may be necessary to distinguish between the valid- 
ity of the regulation itself and the validity of the penalties imposed pursuant to the regu- 
lation. So long as all violators are subject to the same penalties, whether or not there 
were speech aspects to their behavior, the imposition of penalties does not create addi- 
tional first amendment problems. But if behavior with speech aspects is penalized more 
harshly than non-speech behavior because of the institution's special concern for hate 
speech, additional problems may arise. Suppose, for example, that an institution applies 
a destruction of property regulation to student A, who covers a classroom wall with 
nondescript blotches of paint; and to student B, who paints a swastika on a classroom 
wall. If the institution penalizes student B more harshly because he had engaged in hate 
speech, the difference in treatment could be attributable to the content of B's speech. 
The penalty itself then, apart from the regulation, would raise issues under free speech 
principles one and three above and could be unconstitutional. 
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institution prohibits shouting (or use of a bullhorn) on the dormi- 
tory quadrangle between 1:00 and 6:00 a.m., the regulation may 
be used to punish a student for shouting racial epithets so long as 
it would also apply to, say, a student shouting out the final scores 
of night games in the American League. 
D. The institution may regulate the content of speech which falls 
within one of several exceptions to the free speech principle pro- 
hibiting regulation of content (no. 1 above). Approach D pools to- 
gether the established exceptions that are potentially relevant to 
the hate speech problem [30, pp. 3-5]. Thus, for example, if hate 
speech is delivered by the speaker in such a way as to constitute 
incitement, the institution may punish that speech under a regula- 
tion conforming to U.S. Supreme Court definitions of incitement 
[28, pp. 188-90, 192-93]. Parallel reasoning would apply to ob- 
scene speech, defamatory speech, and "fighting words." Each such 
exception is narrow, however, and taken together they would cover 
only a very small portion of hate speech incidents that arise. The 
most adaptable of these exceptions, and the one most frequently 
discussed with reference to hate speech, is the fighting words ex- 
ception [17, pp. 252-63]. But because a fighting words regulation 
would cover so few incidents of hate speech, its importance would 
be mostly symbolic [28, pp. 198-99]. 
E. The institution probably may regulate hate speech that constitutes 
intimidation, threats, or harassment addressed to particular indi- 
viduals and creating in such individuals a realistic fear for their 
physical safety or the security of their property. Such a regulation 
might also possibly be extended to speech creating a realistic fear 
for the physical safety of the individual's family, living group, or 
friends. Speech activities with such effects are analogous to as- 
saults and related actions that typically are punishable under both 
criminal law and tort law [15]. An intimidation/threat/harass- 
ment regulation could apply not only to certain face-to-face con- 
frontations but also to such matters as notes containing threats of 
physical harm and harassing phone calls to a student's dorm 
room. It could also apply to a situation where white male students 
trail a black female student across campus at night, taunting her 
with sexual comments suggesting the possibility of rape; or to a 
situation where white students dressed in KKK garb burst into a 
black student's room at night, burn a paper cross, and make ra- 
cially derogatory comments. Such activities, even though they are 
carried out in part through speech, may be narrowly regulated be- 
cause the danger of physical harm to person or property, and the 
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accompanying psychic injury to the person so threatened, will 
override whatever speech interest may be at stake [29, pp. 571-72 
(appendix, pt. 3)].5 
F. The institution probably may regulate hate speech that occurs in 
private areas of the campus and thereby infringes upon privacy 
interests of persons who are legitimately in these private places. 
The area most likely to qualify as private for purposes of such a 
regulation is the college dormitory, especially its private living 
areas. Library carrels and similar study areas would also likely 
qualify. Under current First Amendment doctrine, such private 
areas are not considered to be "public forums" open to public dia- 
logue; and the persons occupying such private places may be con- 
sidered "captive audiences" who cannot guard their privacy by 
avoiding the hate speech [29, pp. 501-4]. Thus a hate speech reg- 
ulation limited to such circumstances may be constitutional even 
though a similar regulation applicable to public areas of campus 
would not be. If a white student places a racially derogatory poster 
in a dorm room corridor of a black theme dorm, for example; or 
if students tape a bouquet of condoms and a sign proclaiming 
"Jewish slut" to the door of a female student's dorm room, the in- 
stitution should be able to reach such activity under a narrowly 
drawn regulation protecting privacy interests. 
G. The institution may be able to regulate hate speech that serves to 
implement or reinforce a practice of discrimination by a campus 
organization or informal campus group. If a campus fraternity 
places a sign in front of its house reading "No Blacks Allowed," 
for instance, this speech may be an act of discrimination, making 
it less likely that black students would seek to become members of 
that fraternity. When such speech is an integral element of a pat- 
tern of discriminatory conduct, the institution should be able to 
cover the speech under a regulation prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of identifiable group characteristics such as race, sex, or 
ethnicity. In effect, the goal of eradicating such discrimination 
5This regulatory approach could also raise the problem of "differential penalties," dis- 
cussed with respect to a prior regulatory approach in note 4 above. Suppose, for exam- 
ple, that an institutional regulation generally prohibited intimidation, but the institution 
penalized intimidation involving hate speech more harshly than intimidation accom- 
plished by other means. The question would be whether this harsher penalty was based 
on the content or offensiveness of the speaker's message and, if so, whether the First 
Amendment would countenance such a differentiation. A similar problem could arise 
where an institution had a regulation that punished intimidation accomplished through 
hate speech or behavior but had no regulations covering other types of intimidation ac- 
complished through other means. 
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within the campus community is a compelling interest that justi- 
fies the limited intrusion into the discriminators' speech interests. 
H. The institution may be able to regulate hate speech which is part 
of a pattern of hate behavior whose effects on the targeted group 
are so pervasive that group members are unable to benefit fully 
from campus educational opportunities. This rationale draws heav- 
ily upon the First Amendment view of the university as a "special 
environment." Under this rationale, pervasive patterns of hate 
speech, left unchecked, would undermine equal educational op- 
portunity for the targeted group [23, pp. 275-77, 317-18], and 
the institution would then have a compelling interest in interven- 
ing to reestablish conditions of equality [17, pp. 250-51]. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that colleges and universities need 
not tolerate First Amendment activities that "substantially inter- 
fere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education" 
[9, p. 189; 35, p. 277]. The Court has also held that eradication 
of race discrimination in higher education is a compelling interest 
that may override First Amendment claims [1, p. 2035; see also 
35, p. 270]. The reasoning of such cases would arguably support 
narrow equal educational opportunity regulations that punish hate 
speech and other hate behavior in order to protect the targeted 
group from further harm. Such regulations could be invoked 
against student organizations or individual students only when a 
continuing pattern of hate speech has created educational harms 
sufficient to substantiate the institution's compelling interest in 
reestablishing conditions of equality. Were such a regulation chal- 
lenged in court, the institution would have the burden of demon- 
strating that there is a pervasive pattern of hate speech on campus 
that has created a denial of equal educational opportunity to an 
identifiable racial or other minority group. 
Phase VIII. This phase further responds to criterion no. 5 above. 
Even if the institution devises a regulatory initiative that falls squarely 
within one or more of the approaches in Phase VII, other constitutional 
problems may still need to be addressed. The institution's system of pen- 
alties for hate speech violations may raise additional First Amendment 
concerns if hate speech is penalized more harshly than other activity vio- 
lating the same institutional regulation.6 The state constitution may pro- 
tect some aspects of free expression to a greater degree than does the 
6This is the "differential penalties" problem discussed in notes 4 and 5 above. The 
problem could arise under regulatory approaches B, C, E, and F in Phase VII, and per- 
haps under G. 
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federal Constitution, thus creating stricter constraints on the institution 
[13, pp. 10, 25-27; 30, p. 6]. Or, if the institution seeks to apply its regu- 
lations not only to students but also to faculty or other employees, addi- 
tional First Amendment considerations may come into play.7 And most 
importantly, the federal constitutional doctrines of overbreadth and 
vagueness (free speech principle no. 4, above) will subject the institution 
to stringent standards concerning the narrowness and clarity of its regu- 
latory language. 
The strictures that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines place 
upon the drafting of hate speech regulations are well illustrated by the 
case of Doe v. University of Michigan [6]. The plaintiff, a graduate stu- 
dent, challenged the university's hate speech policy. The policy's central 
provision was aimed at "any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigma- 
tizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, 
sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital sta- 
tus, handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status." The policy prohibited 
such behavior if it "involves an express or implied threat" to, or "has the 
purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering" with, or "creates 
an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment" for individual pur- 
suits in academics, employment, or extracurricular activities. This pro- 
hibition applied to behavior in "educational and academic centers, such 
as classroom buildings, libraries, research laboratories, and recreation 
and study centers." Focusing on the wording of the policy and the way 
in which the university had interpreted and applied the policy's lan- 
guage, the court held the policy to be unconstitutionally overboard on 
its face because its wording swept up and sought to punish substantial 
amounts of constitutionally protected speech. In addition, the court held 
the policy to be unconstitutionally vague on its face. This fatal flaw arose 
primarily from the words "stigmatize" and "victimize" and the clauses 
concerning a "threat" to or an "interfering" with an individual's aca- 
demic pursuits - language which was so vague that students would not 
be able to discern what speech would be protected and what would be 
prohibited. 
7The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a special area of law governing the free 
speech rights of public employees, and lower courts have frequently applied this law to 
faculty and staff members of higher educational institutions [13, pp. 184-86]. For cases 
concerning faculty expression alleged to be demeaning or offensive, see Martin v. Par- 
rish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986), Omlor v. Cleveland State University, 45 Ohio St.3d 
187, 543 N. E.2d 1238 (1989), and Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District, 759 
F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985). The institution's regulatory actions were upheld in all three 
cases. But see Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), a faculty hate 
speech case in which the faculty member prevailed on free speech and due process 
grounds. 
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Similarly, in UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Wisconsin System [34], the court utilized both overbreadth and 
vagueness analysis to invalidate a campus hate speech regulation. The 
regulation applied to "racist or discriminatory comments, epithets, or 
other expressive behavior directed at an individual" and prohibited any 
such speech which "intentionally" (1) "demean(s)" the race, sex, or other 
specified characteristics of the individual, and (2) "create(s) an intimidat- 
ing, hostile, or demeaning environment for education. . . ." The court 
held this language to be overbroad because it encompassed many types 
of speech that would not fall within any existing exceptions to the prin- 
ciple that government may not regulate the content of speech. Regard- 
ing vagueness, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the phrase 
"discriminatory comments, epithets, or other expressive behavior" and 
the word "demean" were vague. But the court nevertheless held the regu- 
lation unconstitutionally vague because another of its provisions, juxta- 
posed against the language quoted above, created confusion as to whether 
the prohibited speech must actually demean the individual and create a 
hostile educational environment or whether the speaker must only in- 
tend those results and they need not actually occur. 
Phase IX. This phase further responds to criteria no. 1 and no. 4 
above. In addition to the legal considerations that are central to Phases 
VII and VIII, there are also various strategic considerations that the in- 
stitution must address in drafting hate behavior regulations. Phase IX 
identifies the most important of these strategic considerations. There are 
policy implications to each of the strategic choices set out in this phase, 
and some of these choices may also have legal implications relating to 
the approaches and considerations in Phases VII and VIII. The choice 
regarding groups to be protected (IX.B) has engendered the most con- 
troversy thus far [17, pp. 241-44; 18, pp. 2357, 2361-63; 27, pp. 937-38; 
29, pp. 506-7, 558-59]. But other choices are similarly difficult [17, pp. 
244-45 (choice IX.A), pp. 245-46 (choice IX.E)]. Regarding intent re- 
quirements (choice IX. E), for instance, it is difficult to distinguish words 
intended to hurt a person from words intended to convey information 
including information about the speaker's emotional state. A speaker 
may also have "mixed motives," intending in part to hurt but also in part 
to convey information [8, p. 298]. Or the speaker's intent may be impene- 
trable; it is not realistically possible to discern with any assurance what 
the intent was. Moreover, attempts to assess a speaker's intent may be- 
come tainted by subtle biases of those making the assessment; "there is a 
powerful tendency to attribute bad motives to those with whom we fun- 
damentally disagree" [23, p. 324 n.253]. Although civil and criminal 
courts may be capable of grappling with such difficulties, they may be 
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beyond the capacities of typical student or student-faculty disciplinary 
boards. Courts draw upon the expertise of judges and attorneys and are 
guided by the structure of formal rules of evidence, formal procedural 
rules, and a body of judicial precedent. Institutional disciplinary boards 
generally do not have such expertise or such structure to assist them in 
making the fine-grained distinctions that intent requirements may entail. 
Conclusion 
As a general proposition, it is important for colleges and universities 
to focus on the processes they use to make and implement policy deci- 
sions. With a problem as sensitive and complex as the hate speech prob- 
lem, process questions become a critical consideration, and a carefully 
structured process for decision making becomes a critical necessity. To 
guide institutions in these circumstances, this article has provided a pro- 
posed process in nine phases, along with suggestions for its implementa- 
tion. This article also provides five criteria that may be used to formulate 
or to evaluate other processes an institution may wish to consider. Third, 
the article identifies the four key principles of First Amendment law that 
circumscribe the institution's discretion to deal with hate speech and 
suggests regulatory options that may be implemented consistent with 
these four principles. Careful attention to process, along the lines sug- 
gested in this article, may increase the campus community's receptivity 
to institutional decisions and initiatives concerning hate speech, may 
help defuse intergroup and interpersonal tensions on campus, and may 
enhance the quality and clarity of whatever policy and legal decisions the 
institution makes. 
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